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Pushing on a String: US Monetary Policy Is Less Powerful 
in Recessions†
By Silvana Tenreyro and Gregory Thwaites*
We investigate how the response of the US economy to monetary 
policy shocks depends on the state of the business cycle. The effects 
of monetary policy are less powerful in recessions, especially for 
durables expenditure and business investment. The asymmetry 
relates to how fast the economy is growing, rather than to the level 
of resource utilization. There is some evidence that fiscal policy 
has counteracted monetary policy in recessions but reinforced it in 
booms. We also find evidence that contractionary policy shocks are 
more powerful than expansionary shocks, but contractionary shocks 
have not been more common in booms. So this asymmetry cannot 
explain our main finding. (JEL E21, E22, E32, E52)
Is monetary policy effective in recessions? In recent years this perennial ques-tion took center stage in the public policy debate, as central banks in the United 
States and Europe faced the deepest postwar crisis. A priori, whether monetary pol-
icy is more powerful in recessions or expansions is unclear. Expenditure could be 
more or less sensitive to real interest rates at different points in the business cycle. 
Imperfections in the financial system might magnify or dampen the transmission 
of policy at different times. Prices might be more or less sticky. And the systematic 
component of monetary policy itself might behave differently. Previous work has 
studied this question, and adjacent ones, finding mixed results.
We investigate this question anew on US data, and find strong evidence that mone-
tary policy shocks typically have much more powerful effects on output and inflation 
in an expansion than in a recession. In order to allow impulse response functions to 
depend on the state of the business cycle, we adapt the local projection method of Jordà 
(2005) and combine it with the smooth transition regression method of Granger and 
Teräsvirta (1993).1 We investigate the state dependence of monetary policy impulse 
1 Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014) use a similar procedure to study the 
effect of fiscal policy, though the method has never been applied to the analysis of monetary policy. 
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response functions in this framework, examining the response of a range of real and 
nominal variables to monetary policy shocks identified in the manner of Romer and 
Romer (2004).
The main result from our investigation is that shocks to the federal funds rate are 
more powerful in expansions than in recessions. Nearly all of the effect we observe 
on average in the data is attributable to the effect in good times, and in particular to 
the response of durable consumption and business and household investment. In an 
expansion, output and then inflation fall in response to a negative monetary shock 
in the textbook fashion. Within this, and in line with previous findings, business 
investment and consumer expenditure on durable goods and housing are substan-
tially more sensitive than other expenditures, whereas the responses of durables and 
nondurables prices are much closer together. In a recession, in contrast, the response 
of output and inflation to monetary policy interventions is much smaller. These 
differences are not attributable to differences in the amplification afforded by the 
response of credit prices or quantities. We find that contractionary shocks are more 
powerful than expansionary shocks—in line with Angrist, Jordà, and Kuersteiner 
(2013), who employ a different method. But given that they are equally common in 
both expansions and recessions, this cannot be the source of asymmetry across the 
business cycle. We study different indicators of the state of the economy and find 
that measures of the growth rate of activity such as gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth are the most reliable determinant of monetary policy effectiveness, whereas 
measures of the level of resource utilization, such as the output gap, do not as clearly 
distinguish regimes. We find that fiscal policy seems to have counteracted monetary 
policy in recessions, but reinforced it in expansions, which provides one explanation 
for our results.
These findings are relevant for the design of stabilization policy and the models 
used to analyze it. If changes in the policy rate have limited impact in a recession, 
central banks will be more likely to need to resort to other (unconventional) mone-
tary policy measures to achieve the desired expansionary effect. Policymakers may 
also need to rely more heavily on fiscal or financial policies to stabilize the economy 
in a deep or protracted slump. On the modeling side, the findings call for macroeco-
nomic models that generate a higher sensitivity in the response of the economy (and 
in particular, the durable-good sector) during expansions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section I reviews the litera-
ture. Section II explains the empirical method and describes the dataset. Section III 
sets out the main results. We conduct sensitivity analysis in Section IV. Section V 
concludes with some thoughts for future research.
I. Literature
There is a small empirical literature on how the impact of monetary policy varies 
with the business cycle, mostly written a decade or more ago. Previous research 
produced mixed results and, perhaps as a result, the mainstream monetary policy 
literature, both theoretical and empirical, has largely ignored the potential for asym-
metries and their policy implications. See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, 
and Evans (2005); Woodford (2011); and Galí (2008). Our paper makes use of 
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important subsequent methodological innovations in the estimation of impulse 
response functions in regime-switching environments.
The closest paper to ours in terms of implementation is Weise (1999). Weise 
(1999) estimates regime dependency with a smooth-transition technique (Granger 
and Teräsvirta 1993), as do we, but applies this to a vector auto-regression (VAR) 
rather than a local projection model. The set of variables in the VAR is small: indus-
trial production, consumer prices, and M1, detrended in complicated piecewise 
fashion over 1960:II–1995:II. Monetary shocks are identified with Choleski orthog-
onalization, putting money last. The regime is indicated by the first lag of quarterly 
GDP growth, such that high-frequency shifts in regime are possible. As with other 
VAR-based regime-switching models (and in contrast to the local projection model 
we employ), the researcher must decide how to account for the possibility that a 
shock causes a shift in regime. In this case, impulse response functions are cal-
culated as the difference between two stochastic simulations with different initial 
conditions for output.
Taken together, the results in this paper are difficult to interpret. In the Weise 
(1999) linear model, a positive shock to the growth rate of M1 reduces output over 
a three-year horizon, against the weight of empirical evidence on this matter. The 
response of output in a high-growth regime is similar to the linear model—i.e., a pos-
itive shock to money growth reduces output, whereas the response in a  low-growth 
regime is almost nonexistent. The price level responds more positively in booms 
than in recessions. So the paper implies that monetary policy is virtually ineffec-
tive in a low-growth regime, and actually contractionary in a high-growth regime, 
a result that is hard to reconcile with the standard empirical result that, on average, 
monetary policy is expansionary.
Garcia and Schaller (2002) studies the response of quarterly industrial production 
growth to monetary policy in the United States from 1955:II to 1993:I. The business 
cycle is identified with a two-state Markov switching regime and the model esti-
mated is given by 
  Δ y t −  μ 0 −  S t μ 1 =  Σ i=1 r ϕ i (Δ y t−i −  μ 0 −  S t−i μ 1 ) +  β iq X t−i +  S t−i β ip X t−i +  ϵ t ,
where  X t is the interest rate in period  t , and  S t = 1 if the economy is in an expan-
sion at time  t . The procedure strongly rejects the null2 that monetary policy, mea-
sured either as the simple level of federal funds rate or as Choleski innovations 
to a standard three-variable VAR, is equally powerful in both regimes, in favor of 
the alternative that they are more powerful in recessions. This method assumes, 
among other things, that the intrinsic persistence and other stochastic properties 
of GDP are the same in booms and recessions. There is substantial evidence that 
this assumption does not hold (see, for example, Acemoglu and Scott 1997 and 
references therein).
Smets and Peersman (2001) study the response of quarterly industrial produc-
tion growth to monetary policy in seven Euro-area countries. First, they identify the 
2 That is to say, the hypothesis that  Σ i=1 r β ip = 0 for  r = 4 . 
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business cycle with a two-state Markov switching regime with fixed autoregressive 
coefficients but state dependent means  μ i,  s t  for each country  i at time  t in state  s 
 Δ y i, t −  μ i,  s t  =  ϕ 1 (Δ y i, t−1 −  μ i,  s t−1  ) +  ϕ 2 (Δ y i, t−2 −  μ i,  s t−2  ) +  ϵ i, t .
They then separately identify monetary policy shocks with a linear VAR and use 
the historical contribution to the time- t policy rate in this VAR as the measure of the 
shock. They add the first lag of monetary policy shocks (the contribution of histori-
cal shocks to the current interest rate) to the auto-regressive model of order 2 (AR2)
  Δ y i, t −  μ i,  s t  =  ϕ 1 (Δ y i, t−1 −  μ i,  s t−1  ) +  ϕ 2 (Δ y i, t−2 −  μ i,  s t−2  ) +  β  s t−1  M P t−1 +  ϵ i, t ,
imposing that the state of the economy is the same across the countries in the sam-
ple. They find that  β is more negative in recessions than in booms—essentially the 
opposite of our finding. This method imposes strong assumptions on the dynamics 
of output. Firstly, it assumes that past monetary policy shocks can be aggregated 
across time in a linear model when the underlying environment may be nonlinear. 
Secondly, it assumes that the propagation of a given monetary shock (the ϕ coeffi-
cients) is the same in different regimes; in other words, all of the difference in the 
impact of monetary policy is apparent in the single  β coefficient.
Lo and Piger (2005) estimate the following equation:
  ϕ (L)  y t T =  γ 0 (L)  x t +  γ 0 (L)  x t S t +  ϵ t ,
where  y t T is the transitory component of log quarterly industrial production, and  x t is 
a monetary policy shock identified from a three-variable structural VAR.  S t is a two-
state Markov-switching process, in which the probabilities of transition from boom 
to recession is a function of state variables  z t . The authors find that putting a constant 
and two lags of a National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recession date 
indicator in  z t yields very strong evidence of asymmetry in the response of output 
to monetary policy. They calculate impulse response functions to a monetary policy 
shock in the four possible combinations of realizations of the state variable  { S t ,  S t+1 } 
and find that monetary policy is most powerful when the economy is in a recession 
either in period  t or  t + 1 . Accordingly, in calculating the impulse response, they 
do not allow the future state of the economy to change, either exogenously or in 
response to a monetary policy shock. Given that the aim of the exercise is to assess 
the impact of monetary policy on output—the state variable—this approach is dif-
ficult to defend.
In results, though not in method, our paper is closer to Thoma (1994), who 
estimates a nonlinear VAR in output and monetary variables, allowing some of the 
coefficients to depend linearly on the deviation of output growth from trend. Like 
us, he finds that monetary shocks (especially contractionary ones) have more pow-
erful effects in expansions than recessions. Unlike the approach we follow, however, 
his approach requires the researcher to make a number of discretionary decisions 
on the econometric specification. In contrast to this and other papers discussed 
above—and importantly for understanding the transmission mechanism—our 
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paper stresses the difference in the response during booms of durables and business 
investment on the one hand and nondurables on the other, a dimension glossed over 
in this literature.
In summary, the general form of empirical model employed in the studies 
above is
  ( y t −  _ y t ) = α (L)  ( y t−1 −  _ y t−1 ) + β ϵ t +  u t ,
where ϵ is the policy shock and  y is the set of outcome variables. These studies 
typically allow only a proper subset of  {α (L) , β,  _ y } to depend on the state of the 
cycle. They must also take a stand on how the policy shock alters the transmission 
between regimes.
In contrast to the methods used previously, a local projection model (Jordà 2005) 
has a number of advantages relative to a VAR. First, it does not impose the dynamic 
restrictions implicit in a VAR—the true model can take any form. Secondly, one 
can economize on parameters and, in some circumstances, increase the available 
degrees of freedom. In particular, one loses observations from the need to use leads 
as dependent variables. But the number of variables on the right-hand side need only 
be enough to ensure that the shocks  ε t are exogenous; none are needed to describe 
the dynamics of the endogenous variable conditional on the shock. If the VAR rep-
resentation involves a large number of variables and lags, the net result will be an 
increase in the available degrees of freedom.
Thirdly—and most importantly for the present study—with a  regime-switching 
local projection model one does not need to take a stand on how the economy 
switches from one regime to another. More specifically, a regime-switching local 
projection model takes the form
  y t+h = F ( z t )  ( β b hϵ t +  γ b ′ x t ) +  (1 − F ( z t ) )  ( β r hϵ t +  γ r ′ x t ) +  u t ,
where  F ( z t ) is an indicator of the regime,  ϵ is the policy shock, and  x is a vector 
of controls. The coefficents  β j h measure the average effect of a shock as a function 
of the state of the economy when the shock hits, and therefore encompasses the 
average effect of the shock on the future change in the economy’s state. In con-
trast, when using a regime-switching VAR model, the impulse response of the VAR 
implicitly assumes no change in the state of the economy, an assumption that is diffi-
cult to defend when we are considering shocks with large real effects. Alternatively, 
the transition from one regime to another effected by the policy shock must itself 
be modelled and simulated, involving a series of potentially erroneous and contro-
versial modeling choices. Ramey and Zubairy (2014) finds that this can have an 
important bearing on the results when estimating the state dependence of US fiscal 
policy. It may explain the difference between our findings and some of those in the 
previous literature on state dependent monetary policy summarized above.
Overall, the theoretical literature has not had much to say about the state dependent 
impact of macroeconomic policy across the cycle. One notable exception is Vavra 
(2013), who in recent work argues that recessions are often characterized by high 
realized volatility, and thus frequent price changes, which leads to a steep Phillips 
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curve and ineffective monetary policy. He estimates a New Keynesian Phillips curve 
on US data and finds support for this hypothesis. Berger and Vavra (2012) simulate a 
model of durables expenditure in the presence of adjustment costs and show that dura-
bles purchases are less sensitive to subsidies when output is low. They also show that 
the conditional variance of an auto-regressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) 
process describing durables expenditure is higher during booms than in recessions, 
suggesting that either aggregate shocks are larger in booms, or that durables expen-
diture is more sensitive to shocks of a given size. They supply additional evidence 
against the former  possibility, suggesting that durables expenditure is more sensitive 
to aggregate shocks—including monetary shocks—during booms. Our findings sup-
port the implication of Berger and Vavra (2012)’s model that monetary policy inter-
ventions are more effective during expansions and that most of the effect results from 
the response of durables and business investment.
II. Econometric Method
In this section we first set out the specification of the econometric model used in 
this study. Then we explain our approach to statistical inference. Finally we describe 
our data sources, our state variables, and our identified policy shocks.
A. Specification
Our econometric model closely resembles the smooth transition-local projection 
model (STLPM) employed in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Ramey and 
Zubairy (2014) to analyze fiscal policy. The impulse response of variable  y t at hori-
zon  h ∈  {0, H} in state  j ∈  {b, r} 3 to a shock  ε t is estimated as the coefficient  β h  j in 
the following regression:
(1)  y t+h  =  τ t  +  F ( z t )  ( α h b  +   β h bε t  +   γ b′ x t )  +   (1  −  F ( z t ) )  ( α h r  +   β h rε t  +   γ r′ x t )  +   u t 
where  τ is a linear time trend,  α h j is a constant and  x t are controls.4  F ( z t ) is a smooth 
increasing function of an indicator of the state of the economy  z t . Following Granger 
and Teräsvirta (1993) we employ the logistic function
  F ( z t ) =  exp (θ 
 ( z t − c)  _ σ z  )   _____________ 
1 + exp (θ  ( z t − c)  _ σ z  ) 
, 
where  c is a parameter that controls what proportion of the sample the economy 
spends in either state and  σ z is the standard deviation of the state variable  z . The 
parameter  θ determines how violently the economy switches from expansion to 
recession when  z t changes.
3  b denotes an expansion,  r denotes a recession. 
4 In the baseline specification,  x t contains one lag each of the dependent variable and federal funds rate. 
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In this paper, for each variable we estimate the  H + 1 equations of the 
 impulse-response function (IRF) at horizon  0,  … , H as a system of seemingly 
unrelated regression equations. By Kruskal’s theorem, this yields the same point 
 estimates of the regression coefficients as equation-by-equation ordinary least 
squares (OLS) because the explanatory variables are the same in each equation. 
But it enables us to calculate the distribution of functions of parameters at different 
horizons, such as the smoothed IRFs presented in the figures.
B. inference
We employ two different approaches to conducting inference on our estimated 
impulse response functions. In order to conduct inference on cumulative impulse 
responses, moving averages, and other functions of response variables at different 
horizons, each of these approaches needs to calculate the correlation of parameter 
estimates between equations. The first approach is to calculate standard errors 
analytically, allowing for the possibility of serially correlated residuals within 
equations and across equations. To capture this, we follow Ramey and Zubairy 
(2014) and use the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) method to adjust standard errors for 
the possibility of correlation in the residuals across dates  t and horizons  h . This 
amounts to estimating the parameters of the equations separately, as above, and 
then averaging the moment conditions across horizons  h when calculating Newey-
West standard errors. Following Jordà (2005), we set the maximum autocorrela-
tion lag  L = h + 1 , where  h is the maximum horizon of the impulse response 
function.
The second approach is to bootstrap the key statistics of interest, namely the sign 
of  β h b −  β h r . This will allow not only for various forms of dependence among the 
residuals, but will also account for the fact that we scale the IRFs with estimated 
parameters (i.e., the impact effect of a policy shock on policy rates). Montiel Olea, 
et al. (2012) argue that proper inference should take account of this, but also that 
standard large sample two-stage least squares (2SLS) statistics can be misleading. 
To perform the bootstrap we construct 10,000 samples with replacement of size  T 
and calculate the fraction of cases in which our null hypothesis does not hold. To 
account for the dependence between our observations, samples are constructed by 
aggregating contiguous blocks of observations of length  H . We transform the result-
ing p-value into a t-statistic for comparability with the other measures.
Inference on the above families of t-statistics— H + 1 for each response vari-
able—will generate a “multiple testing problem:” if we test n true null hypotheses 
at significance level  α , we will on average reject  αn of them. Methods such as 
Holm (1979) exist to deal with this issue. However, in our setting there are no 
strong a priori grounds for specifying at what horizon the effects of monetary 
policy shocks depend on the state of the business cycle, rendering these methods 
inapplicable in the present study. It turns out that the t-statistics we present in 
Section III are strongly correlated at adjacent horizons, alleviating the practical 
concern of this problem. But to deal further with this concern, we also calcu-
late and conduct inference on cumulative impulse response functions at discrete 
horizons.
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C. Data
We work predominantly with chain-linked US National Accounts data down-
loaded from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.5 Where our 
aggregates do not correspond directly with published data, we construct our own 
approximations to the chain-linked aggregates with Tornqvist indices (Whelan 
2000). We work with log levels of volume indices, and quarterly annualized log 
differences of implied deflators.
Our sample period (after the effects of the leads and lags described below are 
taken into account) runs from (shocks occurring in) 1969:I–2002:IV, with the 
response variables measured up to five years later—i.e., the end of 2007. Our sam-
ple runs therefore over the four decades leading up to the beginning of the financial 
crisis but does not include the collapse of Lehman Brothers or the ensuing major 
financial crisis, when the impact of monetary policy could have been different to a 
“normal” recession. 6
D. The State Variable and the Shocks
We define  z t as a seven quarter moving average of real quarterly GDP 
growth. Following Ramey and Zubairy (2014), and in contrast to Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2011), our moving average term  z t is a lagging rather than centered 
moving average, so that future values of response variables do not appear on the 
right-hand side of the regression. Higher values of  θ mean that  F ( z t ) spends more 
time close to the  {0, 1} bounds of the process, moving the model closer to a discrete 
regime-switching setup. Smaller values of  θ mean that more of the observations 
are taken to contain some information about behavior in both regimes. We follow 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) and calibrate rather than estimate the parame-
ters of the smooth transition model, for the same reasons they cite—it is difficult in 
practice to identify the curvature and location of the transition function in the data—
and given the need for distributional assumptions on the error term when estimating 
by maximum likelihood. We set  θ = 3 to give an intermediate degree of intensity 
to the regime switching, and also follow them in defining a recession as the worst 20 
percent of the periods in our sample, setting  c to make this so. The robustness of our 
results to each of these choices is investigated below.
E. nonlinear romer regression
Romer and Romer (2004) identify monetary policy shocks as the residuals from 
an estimated reaction function. The premise of the current study is that the behavior 
of the economy is characterized by important forms of nonlinearity and  state depen-
dence. It is conceivable that the reaction function of the Federal Reserve has also 
been state dependent, such that estimating shocks with a standard linear framework 
5 We use the latest vintage of the data rather than real-time estimates.
6 Using end-quarter data—i.e., the shock in the final month of the quarter—yielded qualitatively similar results 
to those below. 
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would inject state dependent measurement error, potentially generating an apparent 
asymmetry in the response of the economy at different points in the cycle. For exam-
ple, if shocks are measured with greater error in a recession than a boom, response 
coefficients will be more attenuated, biasing our findings towards finding a differ-
ence when there may be none.
To obviate this possibility, we estimate a smooth transition analogue of the origi-
nal Romer and Romer (2004) regression and use the resulting shocks in our baseline 
estimates. To be precise, if we write the original regression as
(2)  ΔFF r t = β ′ X t +  ε t ,
where  X are the control variables employed by Romer and Romer (2004) and the 
estimated residuals  ε ˆ t are the identified monetary policy shocks, then our  state 
dependent identification scheme is
(3)  FF r t = F ( z t )  β b′ X t +  (1 − F ( z t ) )  β r′ X t +  ε ̃ t ,
and  ε ˆ ̃t are our nonlinearly identified shocks.
When estimated linearly over a common sample, we replicate the results exactly; 
when extending the sample, the regression coefficients and hence the residuals 
change slightly, such that our extended series has a correlation of 0.987 with the 
original. The original Romer shocks, the shocks identified with the same method 
on a larger sample, and the nonlinearly identified shocks are all shown in Figure 1, 
which also shows our transformed state variable  F ( z t ) at the baseline parameter val-
ues. All variables are aggregated to quarterly frequency. The figure shows, inter 
alia, that the monetary policy shocks associated with the early part of Paul Volcker’s 
Chairmanship of the Federal Reserve—the period of greatest variability in the 
shocks—took place on the whole at a time of relatively weak economic activity. The 
state dependent policy shocks have a 0.902 correlation with the original series over 
a common sample. In Section IV, we examine the robustness of our findings to the 
use of linearly identified shocks.
III. Results
In this section of the paper, we first set out our baseline results. We then explore 
whether the asymmetry we find is due to a different pattern of shocks across the 
business cycle.
A. Baseline results
The first four columns of Figure 2 show the smoothed impulse responses of the 
volume of GDP, the level of the personal consumer expenditure (PCE) deflator, and 
the federal funds rate to an identified monetary policy shock that generates an initial 
1 percentage point rise in the federal funds rate—i.e.,  h is on the x-axis, and  β h is on 
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the y-axis.7 The first column displays the central estimate of the impulse response in 
expansions (dashed lines), recessions (dotted lines), and a linear model (solid lines, 
where we restrict the coefficient to be constant across regimes). The second to fourth 
columns display central tendencies and 90 percent confidence intervals for the linear 
model, expansions, and recessions, respectively. The charts in the fifth column rep-
resent our two estimates of the t-statistic of the null hypothesis that  ( β h b −  β h r) = 0 , 
with the area between  ±1.65 shaded. So, for example, if the solid line in the fourth 
columns falls below the lower extreme of the area at some horizon  h , we can reject 
the null that the IRFs at that horizon are equal in favor of the alternative that they are 
more negative in expansions at a 10 percent significance level. The IRFs are scaled 
so that the shock results in a 1 percentage point increase in the federal funds rate in 
all three regimes.
Figure 2 shows that the linear model delivers a familiar picture. Following a 
contractionary monetary policy shock, the level of output starts to fall, reaching a 
minimum of about half a percent below baseline two to three years after the shock, 
before beginning to recover. The price level is initially sticky, but eventually falls by 
7 In this case, “smoothed” means three-period centered moving averages of the IRFs, except at the endpoints of 
the function. The standard errors of these moving averages are calculated taking account of the covariance between 
the estimates at different points estimated above. 
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Nonlinearly identified shocks
Probability of an expansion
Figure 1. Monetary Policy Shocks and the State of the Economy
notes: The solid line is the series of monetary policy shocks in Romer and Romer (2004). The dashed line is con-
structed in an identical fashion but over a longer sample. The dotted-dashed line is constructed over the same longer 
sample but with a state dependent regression model. The remaining line is the value of the cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of our state variable  F( z  t ) . See main text for details.
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about 3 percent, flattening off by the end of the horizon. The policy rate is persistent 
but reverts towards and eventually passes through the conditional mean.
The difference between expansions and recessions is seen most clearly in the 
left-hand column of Figure 2. Output responds more strongly in an expansion than 
in a recession, with the maximum fall of about 1 percent in an expansion. The price 
level also falls much more sharply, by about 8 percent in an expansion against 4 per-
cent in a recession. In a recession, the responses of output and prices are mostly 
statistically  insignificantly different from zero. In an expansion, the nominal policy 
rate falls sharply below the conditional mean about two years after the shock, per-
haps because of the systematic component of policy responding to the contraction 
the previous shock has created. It is therefore clear from the figures that the larger 
Figure 2. Impulse Response of Headline Variables to a Monetary Policy Shock
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the response in a linear, state 
independent model, the green dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the red dotted line the response 
in a recession. The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state independent response, 
the third column the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around 
the response in a recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the 
coefficients in an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, 
and the dashed line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row 
is the log-level of real GDP; the second row is the quarterly annualized inflation rate of the GDP deflator; and the 
third row is the level of the federal funds rate.
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response of nominal and real variables in an expansion is not attributable to a bigger 
rise in long-term nominal interest rates.
Table 1 cumulates the impulse response functions for the level of GDP and inflation 
and shows two alternative estimates of how significant the difference between them 
is, as set out above—Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and bootstrapped significance 
tests. The cumulative effect of a monetary policy shock is significantly larger at stan-
dard levels, with the precise horizon depending on how the standard errors are cal-
culated. Figure 3 displays unsmoothed impulse responses of our headline variables.
Figure 4 plots the impulse response of the volumes of three expenditure aggre-
gates to the same shock as before. In line with the response of aggregate output, all 
the volume indices respond much more in an expansion than in a recession, with the 
difference already significant one quarter after the shock. The top row—correspond-
ing to an index of durable household expenditure—responds roughly an order of 
magnitude more than nondurable consumption, both in an expansion and in the linear 
model. In a recession, the response of all three kinds of expenditure is insignificant.
Figure 5 plots the impulse responses of four other macroeconomic variables, 
which may play a role in the transmission of monetary policy shocks. The first 
two rows show the response of real government consumption and net tax revenues 
(as a share of GDP), respectively. The first row shows that there is weak evidence 
that real government consumption responds positively on average to a tightening of 
monetary policy. Why this should be so is not clear. One possibility is that spending 
is set in nominal terms, such that real spending increases because the price level 
falls. However, the behavior of government consumption in response to monetary 
policy at different points in the cycle does not support this explanation. In an expan-
sion, when the disinflationary effects of policy are at their strongest, there is no 
evidence that real government consumption increases in response to a monetary 
policy tightening, whereas there is a significant increase in a recession. It could be 
that the larger fall in the price level we see in an expansion raises the real burden of 
public debt (Sterk and Tenreyro 2015), such that spending cuts become necessary. 
Whatever the reason for this asymmetry, to the extent that increases in government 
consumption are expansionary, they will be offsetting the contractionary impulse 
provided by monetary policy: government spending seems to have been “working 
against” monetary policy during recessions but not during expansions.
There is weaker evidence for the same on the tax side. The second line of Figure 5 
shows that, after the first few quarters, the tax-GDP ratio seems to rise more sharply 
Table 1—Cumulative Impulse Response of GDP and Inflation: Baseline Specification
Regime Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 −0.0194 0.0109 0.0059 0.1233
8 −0.0452 −0.0129 0.1319 0.2316
GDP
12 −0.0751 −0.0240 0.0904 0.1100
16 −0.0721 −0.0393 0.2379 0.2040
4 0.0065 −0.0019 0.1722 0.7865
8 −0.0080 0.0049 0.1920 0.4917
Inflation
12 −0.0481 0.0074 0.0041 0.1401
16 −0.0778 −0.0153 0.0265 0.1958
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in response to a monetary tightening in an expansion than in a recession. This again 
may be due to the stronger response of the price level in an expansion, and its effect 
on the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. To the extent that tax rises are 
contractionary, this will reinforce the effect of monetary policy. However, much of 
the government debt that is being revalued by the disinflation is held by the US pri-
vate sector, who will therefore enjoy a positive wealth shock that will offset much 
of the extra taxation needed to service the increase in debt. This could offset the 
contractionary effect of tax rises to some extent.
The third row of the table shows a measure of the external finance premium—
the Gilchrist-Zakrajšek bond spread (Gilchrist and ZakrajŠek 2012). Monetary pol-
icy could be more powerful in a boom if the external finance premium is more 
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Figure 3. Impulse Response of Headline Variables to Monetary Policy Shock, Unsmoothed
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid line shows the response in a linear, state inde-
pendent model, the dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the dotted line the response in a recession. 
The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state independent response, the third column 
the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around the response in a 
recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in 
an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, and the dashed 
line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row is the log-level 
of real GDP; the second row is the quarterly annualized inflation rate of the GDP deflator; and the third row is the 
level of the federal funds rate.
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strongly increasing in interest rates in good times than in bad, such that the rates at 
which households and firms can borrow move by more than the policy rate suggests. 
However, there is no evidence of an effect in this direction, and by the end of the 
sample, if anything, the opposite appears to be the case: the external finance pre-
mium counteracts the effect of a monetary shock in an expansion. In a recession, the 
premium amplifies the shock. So the response of financing spreads cannot explain 
why policy is more powerful in a boom. The difference in the response—which 
would tend to generate an opposite result to the one we find for the impact of mon-
etary policy on expenditure and prices—is not quite significant at standard levels.
The fourth and final row depicts the response of private nonfinancial credit volumes 
in relation to GDP. There is weak evidence that, on average, a monetary  tightening 
reduces the credit-to-GDP ratio. The middle column shows that this evidence is 
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Figure 4. Impulse Response of Expenditure Volumes to a Monetary Policy Shock
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid line shows the response in a linear, state inde-
pendent model, the dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the dotted line the response in a recession. 
The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state independent response, the third column 
the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around the response in a 
recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in 
an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, and the dashed 
line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row is the volume 
of business investment; the second row is the volume of consumption of durables and housing investment; and the 
third row is the volume of consumption of nondurables and services.
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stronger in a boom, with no consistent effect apparent in a recession. However, given 
that both credit spreads and volumes appear to fall more  following a  monetary tight-
ening in booms than in recessions, it is difficult to attribute the  stronger response in 
the price and volume of activity to a stronger response in credit supply.
B. The Distribution of Shocks in Expansions and recessions
One possible explanation for these findings is that the response of the economy 
to monetary policy shocks is indeed nonlinear, but is not directly a function of the 
state of the economy. Rather, it is possible that policy shocks of different kinds are 
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Figure 5. Impulse Response Functions of Fiscal and Credit Variables to a Monetary Policy Shock
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid line shows the response in a linear, state inde-
pendent model, the dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the dotted line the response in a recession. 
The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state independent response, the third column 
the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around the response in a 
recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in 
an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, and the dashed 
line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row is the log-level of 
the volume of government consumption; the second row is the level of the tax-GDP ratio; the third row is the level 
of the Gilchrist-Zakrajšek excess bond premium; and the fourth row is the ratio of private nonfinancial debt to GDP.
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more common at certain times, and it is this that generates the apparent dependence 
of the IRF on the state of the business cycle. If, say, large or positive shocks are 
proportionally more powerful than small or negative shocks, and if they are more 
common in expansions than recessions, then an empirical model like ours that is 
linear in the shocks, conditional on the regime, would misleadingly uncover a larger 
IRF in expansions than in recessions.
Figure 6 and Table 2 shows IRFs for the state independent model modified such 
that positive and negative shocks are allowed to have different effects. We plot 
 { β h + ,  β h − } , h ∈  {0, H} estimated from the following equation:
  y t+h = τ t +  α h b +  β h + max   
 [0,  ε t ] +  β h − min   
 [0,  ε t ] + γ′ x t  +  u t ,
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Figure 6. Impulse Response to Positive and Negative Monetary Policy Shocks
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid line shows the response in a linear, state-inde-
pendent model, the dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the dotted line the response in a recession. 
The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state-independent response, the third column 
the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around the response in a 
recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in 
an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, and the dashed 
line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row is the log-level 
of real GDP; the second row is the quarterly annualized inflation rate of the GDP deflator; and the third row is the 
level of the federal funds rate.
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and again scale  β so that the shock raises the policy rate by one percentage point 
on impact. The figure shows that positive shocks (i.e., monetary tightenings) have 
a much larger impact on output than negative shocks, although the estimates are 
only borderline significant at standard levels. This finding is consistent with those 
in Cover (1992); Long et al. (1988); and Angrist, Jordà, and Kuersteiner (2013). 
The effects of positive and negative shocks on inflation are statistically much harder 
to distinguish, with the difference between them not significant at standard levels. 
However, the finding that contractionary shocks (monetary tightenings) appear 
to have a bigger impact on output, but not necessarily on inflation, than negative 
shocks is interesting in its own right. 8
If positive shocks to the federal funds rate were more common in expansions than 
recessions, the results in Figure 6 might account for the finding that policy tends 
to be more powerful in expansions than recessions. But no such regime-dependent 
pattern in the shocks exists. Figure 7 shows estimates of the probability distribution 
function (PDF) and the CDF of the shocks overall and depending on the state of the 
business cycle.9 There is little difference between the central tendencies of the dis-
tributions of shocks in booms and recessions—positive shocks do not preponderate 
in booms.
The main difference between the two regimes, apparent in Figure 7, is that the 
distribution of shocks is more variable during recessions. If smaller shocks, which 
are more common in booms, are proportionally more powerful, this could also 
explain our finding of a larger average impact of shocks. To check this, we estimated 
the following equation:
  y t+h = τ t +  α h b +  β h sε t +  β h l ε t 3 + γ′ x t + u t ,
i.e., adding the cubed value of the policy shock as an additional explanatory vari-
able. If the coefficent  β h l on this variable were significantly positive (negative), this 
would count as evidence that large shocks of either sign are more (less) powerful. 
8 We estimated another equation in which the impact of policy was allowed to depend both on the sign of the 
shock and on the state of the economy when it hit—i.e., to take on four values at any given horizon. We did not find 
any consistent statistically significant evidence of nonlinearities by the sign of the shock, but the precision of our 
estimates was low given the loss of degrees of freedom inherent in this procedure. 
9 The linear estimate is the raw Romer shocks smoothed with a normally distributed kernel. The expansion 
and recession estimates are generated by weighting the kernel function with the  F ( z t ) and  1 − F ( z t ) , respectively. 
Table 2—Cumulative Impulse Response of GDP and Inflation: Positive and Negative Shocks
Regime Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Positive Negative Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 −0.0108 −0.0101 0.4833 0.1016
8 −0.0415 −0.0153 0.1942 0.0284
GDP
12 −0.0754 −0.0269 0.1137 0.0158
16 −0.0837 −0.0288 0.1171 0.0287
4 0.0018 −0.0098 0.2049 0.4487
8 −0.0097 −0.0185 0.3846 0.2542
Inflation
12 −0.0254 −0.0039 0.2999 0.2597
16 −0.0420 0.0141 0.1024 0.2742
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The left-hand column of Figure 8 plots the functions  β h l , h ∈  {1, H} with associated 
90 percent confidence intervals, while the right-hand column shows t-statistics asso-
ciated with the null hypothesis that  β h l = 0 for each of the variables. The bottom 
row shows some evidence that larger shocks have tended to die out more quickly, 
which may explain why their negative effects on output and inflation are attenuated 
(top and middle rows). Table 3 shows estimates of the cumulative IRFs and signfi-
cance as above.
In summary, positive shocks appear to be more powerful than negative shocks, 
but they are not more common in expansions than recessions. Larger shocks are 
more common in recessions than expansions, and there is weak evidence that they 
are less persistent and have proportionally weaker effects on output and inflation. 
It is accordingly possible that differences across regimes in the distribution of the 
shocks, as opposed to differences across regimes in the response to a given shock, 
explain part of the weaker effect.
IV. Sensitivity Analysis
The following section examines the robustness of our findings to alternative 
choices of the policy shocks (subsection IVA), lags and trends in the regression 
equation (subsection IVB), the state variable  z t (subsection IVC), the phase shift 
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Figure 7. PDFs and CDFs of the Regime-Specific Shocks
notes: Panel A shows the PDF of the shocks in the different regimes. Panel B shows the CDF. The solid lines show 
the distribution during an expansion, the dashed lines in a recession, and the dotted line the average of the two 
regimes.
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of the state variable (subsection IVD), the intensity of regime-switching  θ (subsec-
tion IVE) and the proportion of the sample we call a recession  c (subsection IVF).
A. Alternative Policy Shocks
The monetary policy shocks used in this paper are identified as the residuals from 
an estimated reaction function, modified from Romer and Romer (2004) such that 
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Figure 8. Impulse Response to Cubed Monetary Policy Shocks
notes: The left-hand column shows point estimates and a 90 percent confidence interval for the impulse response on 
cubed monetary policy shocks  ε  t  3 , i.e.,  β h l in the equation  y t+h = τ t +  α h b +  β h sε t +  β h l ε t 3 +  γ b′ x t +  u t . The right-
hand column shows three estimates of the t-statistic testing the hypothesis that  β h l  = 0 . The solid line is calculated 
using a modified Newey-West method, and the dashed line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). 
The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The dependent variable in the first row is the log-level of real GDP; in the second row is 
the quarterly annualized inflation rate of the GDP deflator; and in the third row is the level of the federal funds rate.
Table 3—Cumulative Impulse Response of GDP and Inflation: Small and Large Shocks
Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Cubed MP shock Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 0.0001 0.4686 0.4920
8 0.0023 0.1405 0.7767
GDP
12 0.0085 0.0014 0.8827
16 0.0106 0.0001 0.9278
4 −0.0013 0.1113 0.2387
8 −0.0009 0.3678 0.3285
Inflation
12 0.0021 0.2817 0.5221
16 0.0061 0.0472 0.8332
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the reaction function is itself state dependent. As an alternative to this, Figure 9 and 
Table 4 display the results of using the original linear identification scheme. There is 
very little difference with our baseline results, with the differences we identify being 
slightly larger and statistically more significant.
Figure 10 and Table 5 show the baseline IRFs calculated when  ϵ t are the structural 
shocks recovered from a VAR in the log-levels of GDP, the GDP deflator and the 
federal funds rate, with a Choleski identification scheme in which monetary policy 
is ordered last. The linear IRF is calculated using shocks from a linear VAR, whereas 
the nonlinear IRFs employ shocks calculated with a nonlinear VAR analogous to 
our nonlinear specification of the Romer and Romer (2004) regression. The peak 
response of GDP is significantly larger in a boom, but the difference is generally 
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Figure 9. Impulse Response of Headline Variables to Monetary Policy Shocks Identified Linearly
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid line shows the response in a linear, state inde-
pendent model, the dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the dotted line the response in a recession. 
The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state independent response, the third column 
the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around the response in a 
recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in 
an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, and the dashed 
line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row is the log-level 
of real GDP; the second row is the quarterly annualized inflation rate of the GDP deflator; and the third row is the 
level of the federal funds rate.
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Table 4—Cumulative Impulse Response of GDP and Inflation: Linearly Identified Shocks
Regime Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 −0.0243 0.0117 0.0050 0.0899
8 −0.0565 −0.0138 0.1000 0.1853
GDP
12 −0.0939 −0.0257 0.0620 0.0621
16 −0.0901 −0.0420 0.1846 0.1271
4 0.0081 −0.0020 0.1655 0.8062
8 −0.0100 0.0053 0.1970 0.5020
Inflation
12 −0.0601 0.0079 0.0033 0.1081
16 −0.0973 −0.0163 0.0173 0.1218
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Figure 10. Impulse Response of Headline Variables to Monetary Policy Shocks Identified with a VAR
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid line shows the response in a linear, state inde-
pendent model, the dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the dotted line the response in a recession. 
The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state independent response, the third column 
the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around the response in a 
recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in 
an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, and the dashed 
line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row is the log-level 
of real GDP; the second row is the quarterly annualized inflation rate of the GDP deflator; and the third row is the 
level of the federal funds rate.
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non-monotone, with a larger initial fall in GDP followed by a larger rebound in a 
boom. The difference in the inflation IRFs is much larger than the baseline case.
In summary, therefore, our baseline results are robust to identifying shocks with a 
linear regression in the manner of Romer and Romer (2004), or with a  state depen-
dent VAR and Choleski identification scheme.
B. Trends and Lags in the regression Equation
The baseline regression equation (1) contains a log-linear trend and one lag of 
both the policy and endogenous variable. In this subsection we examine the robust-
ness of our results to both choices.
Figure 11 and Table 6 contain our standard IRFs calculated with a regression 
model identical to (1) except for the omission of a time trend. Qualitatively, the 
results retain the message that monetary policy is statistically and economically 
more contractionary in a boom than in a regression. But the anomalous shape of 
some of the IRFs suggests that a model without a log-linear trend would be mis-
specified. For example, the impulse response of GDP in a recession is uniformly 
positive and not hump shaped, while the impulse response of interest rates in a boom 
becomes very large towards the end of the response horizon. For this reason, we 
retain a log-linear time trend in our baseline model.
Our baseline model contains one lag each of the dependent variable and the fed-
eral funds rate. This lag structure is optimal as indicated by the Schwartz Bayesian 
Criterion (SBC), given by
(4)  −2 ln ( L ˆ ) + k ln (n) ,
where  L ˆ is the maximized value of the likelihood function,  k is the number of regres-
sors and  n is the number of observations in the sample.
As a robustness test, we also calculated optimal lag length with the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) given by
(5)  2 k − 2 ln ( L ˆ ) .
This criterion indicates that two lags are optimal for the dependent variable, and one 
lag is optimal for the policy variable. Figure 12 and Table 7 contain our  standard 
Table 5—Cumulative Impulse Response of GDP and Inflation: VAR Shocks
Regime Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 −0.0239 0.0361 0.0000 0.1299
8 −0.0570 0.0487 0.0031 0.1252
GDP
12 −0.0956 0.0859 0.0008 0.0950
16 −0.0978 0.1185 0.0015 0.1001
4 0.0003 −0.0022 0.4138 0.4365
8 −0.0271 0.0070 0.0455 0.1869
Inflation
12 −0.0850 0.0107 0.0018 0.1547
16 −0.1338 −0.0176 0.0125 0.1737
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Figure 11. IRFs with No Trend in Regression Equation
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid line shows the response in a linear, state inde-
pendent model, the dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the dotted line the response in a recession. 
The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state independent response, the third column 
the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around the response in a 
recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in 
an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, and the dashed 
line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row is the log-level 
of real GDP; the second row is the quarterly annualized inflation rate of the GDP deflator; and the third row is the 
level of the federal funds rate.
Table 6—Cumulative Response of GDP and Inflation: No Trend in Regression
Regime Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 −0.0239 0.0361 0.0000 0.1299
8 −0.0570 0.0487 0.0031 0.1252
GDP
12 −0.0956 0.0859 0.0008 0.0950
16 −0.0978 0.1185 0.0015 0.1001
4 0.0003 −0.0022 0.4138 0.4365
8 −0.0271 0.0070 0.0455 0.1869
Inflation
12 −0.0850 0.0107 0.0018 0.1547
16 −0.1338 −0.0176 0.0125 0.1737
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Figure 12. IRFs with Two Lags in Regression Equation
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid line shows the response in a linear, state inde-
pendent model, the dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the dotted line the response in a recession. 
The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state independent response, the third column 
the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around the response in a 
recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in 
an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, and the dashed 
line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row is the log-level 
of real GDP, the second row is the quarterly annualized inflation rate of the GDP deflator, and the third row is the 
level of the federal funds rate.
Table 7—Cumulative Response of GDP and Inflation: Two Lags of LHS Variable
Regime Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 −0.0217 0.0102 0.0029 0.1158
8 −0.0487 −0.0135 0.1180 0.2225
GDP
12 −0.0798 −0.0199 0.0500 0.0840
16 −0.0761 −0.0364 0.1881 0.1813
4 0.0112 −0.0085 0.0144 0.8536
8 0.0002 −0.0073 0.3068 0.7026
Inflation
12 −0.0361 −0.0083 0.0843 0.2780
16 −0.0652 −0.0329 0.1565 0.3069
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IRFs calculated with a regression model identical to the baseline but with the lag 
structure preferred by the AIC. The overall qualitative picture from the IRFs is 
unchanged. But there is statistically significant evidence that policy is somewhat 
more disinflationary in a recession than a boom in the short run, although the oppo-
site is true in the long run. However, the GDP impulse response in a recession is 
once again not hump shaped. So there is once again a question about whether the 
regression is misspecified when two lags are included. In light of this evidence and 
that from our preferred SBC, our baseline lag structure is warranted.
C. The State Variable
Our baseline results employ a measure of the economic cycle—a moving average 
of GDP growth—to which there are many reasonable alternatives. This subsection 
examines the sensitivity of our results to three of them.
Figure 13 and Table 8 show the response of our headline variables when  Z t is a 
moving average of a  {0, 1} indicator of recession, defined as the proportion of the 
quarter in which the economy was in recession, as determined by the NBER. The 
difference in the response of output over the near term remains significant at stan-
dard levels when the standard errors are calculated asymptotically, but not when 
bootstrapped. The difference in cumulative inflation switches sign, and is significant 
at very short and long horizons when calculated asymptotically, but not at interme-
diate horizons. The cumulative response of the interest rate—evident in the bottom 
row of Figure 13—is much weaker in a boom than in a recession, complicating any 
inference about the impact of a comparable monetary impulse.
Figure 14 and Table 9 contain the results of the same test but define  Z t as an 
Hodrick–Prescott-filtered output gap. An HP filter is already essentially a centered 
moving average of the level of GDP, so no further filtering or phase shifting is under-
taken. The charts and tables show that when output is low, policy contractions are 
more disinflationary. However, given that output detrended in this fashion contains 
information about future output, and that the evidence is statistically weak, we do 
not place much weight on this possibility.
To sum up, the balance of evidence suggests that when the economy is growing 
quickly, monetary policy shocks are more powerful with respect to output. There is 
some evidence that when the level of output is low, policy shocks are more disin-
flationary, but the interpretation of this evidence is complicated by the detrending 
procedure, which implicitly includes leads of the response variable.
D. Phase Shift of State Variable
Figure 15 and Table 10 show the baseline IRFs calculated when, following 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011), rather than Ramey and Zubairy (2014),  z t is 
a centered rather than lagging moving average of output. The gap between booms 
and recessions shrinks somewhat and appears earlier in the case of GDP growth, 
but the broad picture remains for both output and inflation, and remains statistically 
signficant in the case of output. So our results do not appear to be an artifact of using 
a centered moving average to calculate the state of the economy.
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Table 8—Cumulative Impulse Response of GDP and Inflation: NBER State Variable
Regime Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 −0.0091 0.0170 0.0445 0.4960
8 −0.0303 0.0267 0.0168 0.3464
GDP
12 −0.0413 0.0047 0.0785 0.3120
16 −0.0370 −0.0446 0.4060 0.4080
4 0.0044 −0.0158 0.0435 0.8068
8 −0.0033 −0.0211 0.2384 0.6857
Inflation
12 −0.0196 −0.0500 0.2120 0.5844
16 −0.0296 −0.1109 0.0503 0.6805
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Figure 13. IRFs with NBER Recession State Variable
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid line shows the response in a linear, state inde-
pendent model, the dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the dotted line the response in a recession. 
The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state independent response, the third column 
the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around the response in a 
recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in 
an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, and the dashed 
line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row is the log-level 
of real GDP; the second row is the quarterly annualized inflation rate of the GDP deflator; and the third row is the 
level of the federal funds rate.
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Figure 14. IRFs with HP-Filtered Output Gap as State Variable
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid line shows the response in a linear, state inde-
pendent model, the dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the dotted line the response in a recession. 
The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state independent response, the third column 
the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around the response in a 
recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in 
an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, and the dashed 
line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row is the log-level 
of real GDP; the second row is the quarterly annualized inflation rate of the GDP deflator; and the third row is the 
level of the federal funds rate.
Table 9—Cumulative Impulse Response of GDP and Inflation: HP-Filtered Output as State Variable
Regime Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 0.0006 −0.0028 0.3891 0.4355
8 −0.0099 −0.0248 0.2799 0.4860
GDP
12 −0.0222 −0.0535 0.2681 0.5420
16 −0.0301 −0.0773 0.2488 0.5646
4 0.0027 0.0008 0.4482 0.5301
8 0.0017 −0.0262 0.1295 0.6362
Inflation
12 −0.0056 −0.0919 0.0326 0.7933
16 −0.0172 −0.1280 0.0658 0.7558
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Figure 15. IRFs with Centered State Variable
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid line shows the response in a linear, state inde-
pendent model, the dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the dotted line the response in a recession. 
The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state independent response, the third column 
the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around the response in a 
recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in 
an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, and the dashed 
line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row is the log-level 
of real GDP; the second row is the quarterly annualized inflation rate of the GDP deflator; and the third row is the 
level of the federal funds rate.
Table 10—Cumulative Impulse Response of GDP and Inflation: Phase Shift in State Variable
Regime Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 −0.0141 0.0165 0.0339 0.1059
8 −0.0573 0.0206 0.0051 0.1503
GDP
12 −0.0954 0.0129 0.0094 0.1291
16 −0.1014 −0.0142 0.0674 0.1410
4 0.0218 −0.0108 0.0926 0.8080
8 0.0233 −0.0106 0.1960 0.7775
Inflation
12 −0.0170 0.0010 0.3437 0.5515
16 −0.0557 −0.0017 0.1699 0.3201
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E. intensity of regime Switching ( θ )
Tables 11 and 12 are analogues of Table 1 but where we have set  θ equal to one 
and ten, respectively. They show that the qualitative message of the earlier analy-
sis is unchanged—our results are robust to reasonable changes in the intensity of 
regime switching.
F. Proportion of Sample in a recession ( c )
Figure 16 and Table 13 show that our qualitative conclusions about the response 
of output to a monetary policy shock are robust to increasing to 50 percent the pro-
portion of the sample judged to be more in a recession than in a boom. The response 
of inflation is now not statistically different across regimes, but similar in qualitative 
terms.
V. Concluding Remarks
We have found statistically strong evidence that standard measures of US mon-
etary policy shocks have had more powerful effects on expenditure quantities and 
prices during economic expansions than during recessions. These findings are robust 
to several variations in the empirical model. They do not appear to be an artifact of 
different patterns in the shocks themselves, but rather the outcome of differences in 
the economic effects of a given shock at different points in the business cycle. There 
Table 11—Cumulative Impulse Response of GDP and Inflation:  θ = 1 
Regime Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 −0.0366 0.0349 0.0025 0.1432
8 −0.0791 0.0190 0.0334 0.2199
GDP
12 −0.1245 0.0194 0.0253 0.1087
16 −0.1089 −0.0213 0.1657 0.1543
4 0.0085 −0.0017 0.2968 0.7168
8 −0.0170 0.0198 0.1283 0.4524
Inflation
12 −0.0902 0.0607 0.0006 0.1007
16 −0.1333 0.0419 0.0063 0.1278
Table 12—Cumulative Impulse Response of GDP and Inflation:  θ = 10 
Regime Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 −0.0139 0.0028 0.0403 0.1027
8 −0.0352 −0.0214 0.2798 0.2592
GDP
12 −0.0662 −0.0323 0.1380 0.1013
16 −0.0684 −0.0401 0.2154 0.1725
4 0.0101 −0.0021 0.0389 0.8623
8 0.0012 −0.0021 0.3982 0.7045
Inflation
12 −0.0340 −0.0101 0.0768 0.2682
16 −0.0659 −0.0312 0.0888 0.2677
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Table 13—Cumulative Response of GDP and Inflation:  c = 0.5 
Regime Significance level of difference
Cumulative impact on At horizon h = Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Bootstrap
4 −0.0141 0.0165 0.0339 0.1128
8 −0.0573 0.0206 0.0051 0.1505
GDP
12 −0.0954 0.0129 0.0094 0.1288
16 −0.1014 −0.0142 0.0674 0.1446
4 0.0218 −0.0108 0.0926 0.8050
8 0.0233 −0.0106 0.1960 0.7684
Inflation
12 −0.0170 0.0010 0.3437 0.5485
16 −0.0557 −0.0017 0.1699 0.3169
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Figure 16. Impulse Response of Headline Variables to Monetary Policy Shock:  c = 50 
notes: The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary policy shock that increases the federal funds 
rate by 1 percentage point on impact. In the first column, the solid line shows the response in a linear, state inde-
pendent model, the dashed line shows the response in an expansion, and the dotted line the response in a recession. 
The second column shows a 90 percent confidence interval around the  state independent response, the third column 
the same interval around the response in an expansion, and the fourth column the interval around the response in a 
recession. The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in 
an expansion and a recession is zero. The solid line is calculated using the  Driscoll-Kraay method, and the dashed 
line using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The shaded area is  ±1.65 . The first row is the log-level 
of real GDP; the second row is the quarterly annualized inflation rate of the GDP deflator; and the third row is the 
level of the federal funds rate.
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is some evidence that fiscal policy offsets monetary policy more in recessions than 
in booms. We also find that monetary contractions are much more powerful than 
expansions. In other words, there is truth in the quote attributed to John Maynard 
Keynes that “you can’t push on a string”—when the economy is weak, monetary 
policy can do little about it.
Standard estimates in the literature that do not allow for state dependent impulse 
responses have masked these differential effects. The findings question the common 
wisdom that cuts in policy rates can stop or mitigate recessions, calling for the anal-
ysis of alternative policy measures during contractions. On the modeling side, the 
literature has hitherto focused on linear, state independent models of monetary pol-
icy transmission. In contrast, these findings call for monetary models that generate a 
higher sensitivity in the response of durable goods during expansions, an asymmetry 
that has been largely glossed over in the theoretical literature.
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